Dupixent was becoming a very large share of its growth, with loss of exclusivity expected around 2030–2031, and management and external analysts openly acknowledging that it would be hard to fully replace.^{[6][9][10][3]}

The portfolio still looked like a mix of consumer health and older general medicines alongside specialty care, while peers were moving toward more focused biopharma models.^{[7][8][11][5]}

Launched Play to Win with four priorities: focus on growth, lead with innovation, accelerate efficiency, and reinvent how the company works.^[8][11][12]

Shifted resources toward specialty care, immunology, oncology, and vaccines while pulling back from slower-growth general medicines.^[3][5][7][8]

Committed to separating consumer health so that Sanofi could look and act more like a focused biopharma company.^{[11][5][7][8]}

Updated the operating model and culture to push clearer accountability and faster decision-making aligned to the new priorities.^[12][8][11]

A clearer sense of direction and focus for the business.^{[5][7][8][11]}

Real disruption inside the company as legacy franchises and structures were rebalanced in favour of growth platforms.^[7][11][5]

More investor questions about margins, because higher research and development spending and transformation costs would weigh on profitability compared with earlier goals.^[8][11][3]

A simpler, more compelling story to the market as an innovation-driven biopharma company focused on higher-growth areas.^{[11][5][7][8]}

Stronger discipline around where capital goes and which deals get done, backed by clearer therapeutic priorities and governance.^[12][8][11]

Raised research and development spending and explicitly accepted lower near-term margins to invest in future growth, including stepping back from an earlier 2025 margin ambition.^[3][8][11]

Built out an immunology pipeline that included candidates such as amlitelimab to sit alongside or follow Dupixent, as well as other autoimmune and neurology programs.^{[13][4][7][12][3]}

Pushed high-profile assets like tolebrutinib in multiple sclerosis and other late-stage bets that were meant to carry more of the load in the next chapter.^{[4][13][7][3]}

Lower operating margins and more earnings volatility, which typically make public investors more cautious.^[8][11][3]

Very high scrutiny on every clinical and regulatory readout, because these programs were positioned as proof points that the higher spending was paying off.^[13][4][3]

If enough of these bets hit, a broader mix of growth drivers and less pressure from the Dupixent patent cliff.^[6][4][7][3]

A stronger scientific profile in immunology and neurology and more options for deeper partnerships and platforms.^{[5][7][11][13]}

Committed to separating consumer health and later agreed to sell a 50 percent stake in Opella to Clayton Dubilier and Rice, in a deal valuing the business at about 16 billion dollars and expected to generate roughly 11 billion dollars of net cash proceeds for Sanofi.^[14][15][5]

Used selected acquisitions and partnerships to shift the portfolio further toward rare diseases, immunology, neurology, and next-generation vaccines.^{[7][11][5][8]}

More operational complexity and change-management work as Sanofi carved out consumer health while keeping everyday activities running smoothly.^[11][5][7]

Mixed reactions from investors, who often wait to see whether freed capital is deployed into assets that clearly improve the pipeline or earnings profile.^{[14][3][5][7]}

A cleaner profile as a focused biopharma company, with less drag from slower-growth or lower-margin businesses.^{[5][7][8][11]}

Capital available for pipeline investments, bolt-on deals, and partnerships that support the shift beyond Dupixent.^{[3][7][11][5]}

Put artificial intelligence at the centre of Sanofi’s operating model, with the stated ambition to become the first pharma company powered by AI at scale.^{[16][17][18][19]}

Reported results that included about one billion dollars redeployed in real time, an 80 percent reduction in out-of-stock incidents that avoided roughly another one billion dollars in lost sales, and more than ten percentage points of improvement in asset utilisation, all driven by AI-supported decision-making.^{[17][19][20][21][16]}

Took a “do not delegate the revolution” stance, with the chief executive officer personally sponsoring efforts such as an internal AI club and an AI “fight club” to push adoption and experimentation.^{[18][22][16][17]}

Built an ecosystem of partners, including OpenAI, Exscientia, Atomwise, Owkin, and others, rather than trying to build everything in house.^{[19][22][16][18]}

Tangible operational gains in areas like supply chain and forecasting, including fewer stockouts and better use of working capital.^{[20][21][16][17][19]}

Real culture and capability shifts as teams adapted to new tools and ways of working, with adoption moving at different speeds across the organisation.^[22][16][17]

Better research and development productivity and shorter timelines if AI is applied well to target identification, trial design, portfolio decisions, and documentation.^{[23][16][18][19]}

New strategic options in data-driven services, analytics offerings, and platform collaborations that build on Sanofi’s AI investments.^{[16][18][19][22]}

Launched cost and efficiency programs that were explicitly framed as a way to fund innovation, not just drive margin.^[8][11]

Targeted significant savings in support functions and general medicines and stated that a large share of those savings would be channeled back into research and development and priority launches.^[11][8]

Simplified the operating model to support Play to Win, with fewer layers and clearer ownership for key decisions.^[12][8][11]

Restructuring expenses and disruption as roles changed, teams were reshaped, and processes were redesigned.^[8][11]

Limited immediate improvement in earnings per share, because much of the freed-up budget was reinvested rather than booked as margin expansion.^[11][8]

A leaner base that can sustain higher research and development spending without permanently compressing margins.^[12][8][11]

A company that moves faster and carries less internal friction as it executes an innovation-heavy strategy.^[8][11]

Managed the vaccines business in a tough post-pandemic environment with changing United States policy, shifting procurement, and higher levels of vaccine scepticism.^[2][24][1]

Guided in early 2026 that vaccine sales would likely be slightly negative for the year, at a time when Sanofi needed strong cash generation to fund elevated research and development and portfolio shifts.^[24][1]

Pressure on revenue and cash flow from a core franchise just as investment demands elsewhere in the portfolio were rising.^{[24][1][4][3]}

Added concern among investors that Sanofi was facing challenges both in emerging growth areas and in one of its traditional strengths.^{[24][1][4][3]}

If not addressed, sustained pressure in vaccines could limit Sanofi’s ability to self-fund innovation and could weaken an area that has historically been a differentiator.^[1][24]

Competitors investing aggressively in new platforms, including messenger RNA and novel combinations, could gain share if Sanofi did not accelerate its own approach.^[7][24]

Over Hudson’s tenure, Sanofi continued to grow revenue and benefited from strong sales of Dupixent and a series of newer launches, yet total shareholder return lagged peers and shares fell on the CEO change announcement.^{[25][26][1][3][4]}

Recent results highlighted good performance from launches such as Sarclisa, Beyfortus, and Altuviiio, but the share price underperformed sector indices and often reacted negatively to strategy and pipeline updates.^{[26][25][3][4]}

Management and analysts recognised that Dupixent had become extremely large relative to the rest of the business and that replacing it would be difficult as patents expire around 2030–2031.^{[9][10][25][6]}

Several late-stage programs produced mixed or negative data, and coverage repeatedly referred to research and development “setbacks” and a “stalled” effort to build the next wave of growth.^{[13][1][3][4][12]}

Extended share-price underperformance and a string of disappointing data points increased pressure on the board to act.^{[26][1][3][4]}

In public companies, multi-year transformations that do not show clear proof points on performance often trigger leadership changes, even when the strategic direction still makes sense.^{[26][1][3][4]}

A leadership transition can demonstrate to investors that the board is serious about tightening capital allocation, research and development governance, and operational discipline while keeping the core strategy in place.^{[26][1][3][4]}

By appointing Belén Garijo, who is known for disciplined execution and who previously worked at both Merck KGaA and Sanofi, the board is signaling that it wants the same broad strategy delivered with a different approach to risk, pacing, and proof points.^{[2][3][4][26]}